Financial Deregulations, Weakness of Market Discipline, and Market Development: Japan's Experience and Lessons for Developing Countries by Fukao, Mitsuhiro
Hitotsubashi University Repository
Title
Financial Deregulations, Weakness of Market
Discipline, and Market Development: Japan's







RightCenter for Economic Institutions 




   
CEI Working Paper Series, No. 2001-17 
 
Financial Deregulations, Weakness of Market 
Discipline, and Market Development: Japan’s 




















Center for Economic 
Institutions 
 
Working Paper Series 
 
Institute of Economic Research 
Hitotsubashi University 
2-1 Naka, Kunitachi, Tokyo, 186-8603    JAPAN 
Tel:  +81-42-580-8405 
Fax:  +81-42-580-8333 
e-mail:  cei-info@ier.hit-u.ac.jp  
 
 
Financial Deregulations, Weakness of Market 
Discipline, and Market Development: Japan’s 

















This paper was presented at the conference on Designing Financial Systems 
in East Asia and Japan: Toward a Twenty-First Century Paradigm. This two-day 
conference was co-organized by the International Monetary Fund and the CEI. It 
was held during September 24-25, 2001 at Hitotsubashi Memorial Hall in Tokyo, 
Japan. A select group of academics, researchers and policy makers from around 
the world gathered to examine the timely issue of how the financial systems and 
corporate governance in East Asia and Japan should be redesigned in order to 
achieve sustainable economic development. The conference included six sessions 
with 17 papers. All the presented papers were added to the CEI series of working 
papers. The series, as well as the contents of the conference, can be reached at 
http://cei.ier.hit-u.ac.jp. 
 
 September 24, 2001 
 Preliminary 
Do not quote 


Financial Deregulations, Weakness of Market Discipline,   
and Market Development:     

























This paper was first presented at the IDB-JCIF Workshop: Financial Crises:  Japan’s 
Experience and Implications for Latin America and the Caribbean Co-sponsored by the 
Japan Bank for International Cooperation on June 11-12, 2001.    The author would like 
to thank Mr. Naokatu Fuji and Ikuko Fueda for their valuable research assistance. 
 ￿
1. Introduction and summary of the paper 

As a result of prolonged weak economy and the declining asset prices in the 
1990, Japanese financial sector faced an enormous bad loan problem.  When a few 
financial institutions failed in 1996, Deposit Insurance Law was amended to allow the 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (DIC) to fully protect all deposits until March 2001.    In 
spite of the full protection of all the deposits beyond the limit of normal coverage, 
public concern over the soundness of financial system became extremely intense after 
the successive failures of Sanyo Securities, Hokkaido Takushoku Bank and Yamaichi 
Securities in late 1997.     
 
Depositors and investors of bank debentures issued by long-term credit banks 
imposed some market discipline.  Deposits flew out of banks with low credit ratings 
because depositors feared that they would not be able to withdraw deposit quickly if 
their banks were closed.  LTCB and Nippon Credit Bank faced a rapid early 
redemption of their debentures because debentures are not covered by the deposit 
insurance system explicitly.  Stock prices of weaker banks fell sharply and triggered 
mild bank runs in some cases. 
 
In view of this sever problem, the government and politicians finally moved.  
The government put up Yen 30 trillion of public money for the protection of depositors, 
the injection of capital for weak banks and the resolution of failed financial institutions.   
Initial capital injection of Yen 1.8 trillion to major banks in the spring of 1988 were too 
small relative to the size of the problem.  In the summer of 1998, the stock price of 
LTCB fell sharply when Sumitomo Trust and Banking effectively refused the merger 
with LTCB.  In October 1998, just before the LTCB went bankrupt, Financial 
Revitalization Act and Bank Recapitalization Act were enacted in disorderly 
atmosphere. 
 
Under Bank Recapitalization Act, Yen 7.5 trillion of capital was injected to 15 
major banks at the end of March 1999.  Unlike the former attempt, this program was 
much better designed, succeeding to eliminate persistent Japan premium that started in 
late 1997.  The gradual recovery of the Japanese economy and the announcements of 
big mergers among major banks have also contributed to calm the public concern over 
the financial system. 
 
Although banks issued large amount of preferred shares to the government, ￿
diluting the ownership of existing shareholders, there were no public outcry of bank 
shareholders.    In spite of the near collapse of major banks, all the shareholder meetings 
that approved the issuance of preferred shares to the government were generally calm.  
No major shareholders objected the deal.  This is because the management of major 
banks are well protected by extensive cross shareholdings with friendly life-insurance 
companies and industrial companies.  While healthy industrial companies sold badly 
performing bank shares, weaker companies bought bank shares so as to be protected by 
banks.  Corporate governance structure of major Japanese life-insurance companies is 
weak because they are organized as mutual companies where representative 
policyholders in policyholders meetings are effectively chosen by the management 
themselves. 
 
The Japanese banking system still has latent unstable factors.  In this paper, 
we will estimate the probability of bank failures by an application of option pricing 
theory to evaluate the risk in the net asset position of individual banks.    We found that 
even at the end of March 2000, significant number of Japanese banks have relatively 
high probability of failures over one-year time horizon.  In order to reduce the 
probability of failures of all money center banks to the equivalent of banks with A1-A2 
credit rating by Moody's Investor Service, the banks, in aggregate, have to raise Yen 16 
trillion of capital (about US$160 billion at 100 yen/dollar) that is almost as big as their 
collective core capital.  In other words, weaker large Japanese banks have to double 
their current core capital to recover their true soundness. 
 
Japan still faces a number of problems in its financial system.  Firstly, the 
profit margin is too small to cover the increased default risk after the crush of the bubble.   
Many firms have not overcome their debt overhang and surviving with the help of their 
banks.  Banks have not succeeded to increase their lending margin under a strong 
competitive pressure from government-backed financial institutions.  They are also 
facing a strong pressure from FSA to increase lending to small and medium sized firms.   
This is because banks were obliged to increase such lending as a condition of capital 
injection by the government in 1999.  As a result, banks cannot raise capital by 
promising a good return to investors.  In order to allow the capital market to function 
as the source of recapitalization of Japanese banking sector, it is necessary to remove 
market distortions created by the government-backed financial institutions and the FSA 
requirements on new lending to small and medium sized companies.  Without strong 
market discipline on banks from shareholders, we may not be able to overcome 
bad-loan problem. ￿
 
  Secondly, banks still have excessive stock  investment.  Although  banks  show 
Yen 35.2 trillion of capital on their balance sheet at the end of March 2000, this figure is 
inflated with Yen 8.2 trillion of deferred tax asset (present value of future tax shelter) 
and Yen 7.5 trillion of capital injection by the government.  Since banks pledge that 
they will repay the injected capital, the remaining net capital is only Yen 24 trillion even 
if we take account of the after-tax unrealized capital gain in their stock portfolio.    This 
permanent capital is small compared with their stock portfolio of Yen 54.5 trillion and 
Yen 63.4trillion problem loans.  It is necessary to unwind crossholding of shares 
between banks and other companies that had also weakened the market discipline on 
entrenched management. 
 
Thirdly, we still have to remove the government guarantee of all the banking 
sector liabilities.  The government decided to postpone the removal of full protection 
of deposits at the end of 1999.  This measure has weakened the market discipline on 
banks.  As soon as we can stabilize financial system, we have to introduce 
risk-adjusted deposit insurance premium so as to strengthen market discipline on banks.   
Here, we also take account of the existence of huge postal saving system that is fully 
guaranteed by the government.  In order to remove market distortion by the postal 
saving system, we have to privatize the system to have a level-playing field among 
deposit taking financial institutions. 
 
  Finally, we have to stabilize life insurance sector, exemplified by the recent 
failure of Chiyoda Life and Kyoei Life.  Life insurance companies promised high 
minimum returns on their long-lasting life insurance and annuity policies in the 1980s 
and early 1990s.  Since they did not match the duration of their assets and liabilities, 
they faced an enormous negative yield gap when Japan experienced a very low nominal 
interest rates in the late 1990.  Life insurance policies are an important saving 
instrument in Japan and this sector controls about Yen 180 trillion of asset.    Moreover, 
banks provide subordinated credit and surplus notes to mutual life insurance companies 
amounting Yen 2.3 trillion at the end of March 2000. On the other hand, life-insurance 
companies provide Yen 6.7 trillion of subordinated credit to banks and own Yen 7.7 
trillion of bank stocks.  Given this double gearing between life insurance companies 
and banks, the systemic risk of Japanese financial system remains high and capital 
market cannot provide adequate discipline on the management of banks. 
 
2. Real estate bubble and financial crisis ￿
  In this section, we briefly review the process of asset price bubble and the 
developments of financial crisis in the 1990s. 
 
2. 1. The Origin of the problem 
  In order to examine the origin of the Japanese financial problems, we briefly 
review the magnitude of Japanese asset price bubble in the 1980.    The market value of 
the Tokyo Stock Exchange 1st section as a ratio to nominal GDP had been staying 
between 20 to 40 percent range from early 1950s to early 1980s.  However, the stock 
prices started to rise in the mid 1980s and reached 140 percent by the end of 1989.  
After the crush of the bubble, this ratio fell to about 50-80 percent range.    In relation to 
nominal GDP, the residential land price almost doubled in the second half of 1980s and 
the commercial land price tripled in the same period.  After the bubble, the fall of 
commercial land price index is extremely sharp, falling to less than 20 percent of the 
peak level relative to nominal GDP. 
 
Chart 1 and Chart 2 
 
  The asset price bubble was created by the following three factors; loose monetary 
policy, tax distortions, and financial deregulations.1  In countries where these three 
factors were in place, asset price inflation was often observed.  In this respect, 
Japanese case was not a singular phenomenon.    However, the magnitude of the asset 
price bubble in Japan was enormous and impact of its collapse was extremely severe. 
 
(1) Easy Monetary Policy 
  Japanese monetary policy in the late 1980s was clearly too loose.    Policy makers 
put too much weight on stabilizing the appreciating yen and too little weight on 
stabilizing the asset price inflation and the overheating economy.  The Bank of Japan 
tried to tighten monetary policy in the late 1987 so as to counter overheating economy 
and rising asset prices.    However, the sharp fall in stock prices on Black Monday in the 
United States in October prevented this move.    The Bank did not raise its discount rate 
until May 1989, and failed to stop the asset price inflation at an early stage.    The stock 
prices defied the intention of the Bank of Japan and it continued to rise until the end 
1989.  The land prices hit its peak in early 1990.  If the Bank had acted in late 1987 
or early 1998, it could have alleviated the severity of asset price deflation in the 1990. 
 
1  See Shigemi [1995] and BIS [1993] on the causes of asset price inflation in major countries. ￿
(2) Tax distortions 
  Japanese tax system favored debt financed real-estate investment until the end of 
the bubble.  Since tax distortions on real-estate investment are extensive only major 
factors are illustrated. 
 
(i)  Marginal rate of inheritance tax has been very high in Japan.  It was 75 percent 
over 500 million yen until 1988 and it is still 70 percent over 2 billion yen.    However, 
the evaluation of land for taxation used to be about one half of the market value and the 
debt was evaluated at its face value during the bubble period.  As a result, wealthy 
individuals borrowed money to buy land so as to reduce the inheritance tax. 
 
(ii)  Capital gain on land is not taxed until the time of its sales and the interest rate 
payments can be deducted from taxable income for companies and for those individuals 
who are investing in condominiums and offices.  Moreover, the effective property tax 
rate on land was very low, about 0.1 percent of the market value, until early 1990s.    As 
a result, a large number of real estate investments were carried out for tax planning 
purposes. 
 
(3) Financial deregulations. 
  Financial system in Japan was liberalized very  gradually.  Driving  forces  behind 
this liberalization process were the massive issuance of government bonds in the late 
1970s and the increasing internationalization of financial markets.  Ceilings on bank 
deposit interest rates were liberalized gradually from large-denomination to smaller 
ones from 1985 to 1994.  Restrictions on the issuance of corporate bonds were 
gradually liberalized during 1980s.  As a result, large listed companies, which are 
traditional customers of Japanese banks, gradually shifted their funding from banks to 
capital market.    Banks faced a prospect of profit squeeze due to rising funding cost and 
declining customer base. 
 
  In view of the declining rent from traditional business of retail deposit taking and 
commercial lending to large firms, banks tried to increase middle-market business.  
Most banks started to increase real estate lending.  In expanding such lending, banks 
exclusively relied on collateral and paid little attention to cash flow of underlying 
business.    This was because the nominal land price in Japan was on a rising trend since 
the end of the World War II and the pace of land-price inflation was higher than 
government bond interest rates on average.  This land price performance created a 
general perception to bankers that they can always avoid loan losses as long as loans are ￿
secured by real estate.  This was certainly true until the collapse of the bubble in the 
1990s.  Many banks solicited loans to customers by providing information on real 
estate investment opportunities.  During the bubble period, even an ordinary salaried 
worker living in Tokyo could easily borrow up to 100 million yen for any purposes at 
long-term prime rate if his house can be used as a collateral.  Thus, financial 
liberalization created a perfect environment for asset price bubble where firms and 
households can easily acquire real estate with borrowed money in the 1980s. 
 
  The financial intermediation by banks expanded significantly in the 1980s.    The 
bank lending-GDP ratio rose from 70 percent of GDP in late 1970s to 108 percent by 
1990.    The composition of loan portfolio of Japanese banks also changed dramatically.   
The share of manufacturing sector in the loan portfolio declined from 25 percent in 
1977 to less than 15 percent by the end of 1980s.    On the other hand, the share of loans 
to real estate and financing companies rose sharply in the same period.   Since lending 
to financing companies such as Jusen (housing loan companies) is often on-lent to real 
estate investment, the involvement of banks in real estate related lending was very large 




2.2. Slow-moving financial crisis: 1991-96 
(1)  Increasing problem loans 
  Reflecting a successive tightening of monetary policy from May 1989 until 
February 1991, the stock and real estate prices started decline rapidly.  The ratio of 
land price index and nominal GDP index declined twice in the past 30 years (see Chart 
2).  In the early 70s when this ratio declined, the nominal land price did not decline 
much and this fall was induced by a sharp inflation of goods and services.  However, 
in the 90s, the fall in this ratio was induced by a fall in nominal land prices.  These 
differences are important in evaluating the fallout from the collapse of the bubble.  In 
the first episode, investors who bought land with borrowed money could repay their 
debt.  On the other hand, in the second episode, the real estate investors could not 
honor their debt obligations. 
 
  At first, bankers and bank supervisors thought that the fall in land prices would be 
temporary.    They expected that by waiting for a recovery of the economy, banks could 
eventually recover most of their bad loans.    However, the wait and see strategy did not 
work this time and the real estate prices continued to fall.  The understatement of bad ￿
loan problems by some banks rapidly became a falsification of financial statements.  
Since a falsification of financial statements of listed companies carries a stiff criminal 
penalty, the management of banks with large bad loans faced a difficult choice, covering 
up the extent of their problem to keep their bank open or face a bank run by disclosing 
the reality and they chose the first option.  Apparently, bank supervisors actively 
supported this choice of banks until early 1997. 
  
  (2)  Declining Credit Ratings and Japan Premium 
  Reflecting the increasing loan losses and declining stock prices, the credit rating 
of Japanese banks declined rapidly.  In mid 1980s, Japanese banks enjoyed highest 
credit ratings under regulated interest rates and huge unrealized capital gains in their 
equity portfolio.  However, financial deregulations and asset-price deflation 
completely changed the relative credit worthiness position of Japanese banks.  By 
1992, Japanese banks have the lowest average credit rating among major countries. 
 
  Against this dire picture, both the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the Bank of 
Japan (BOJ) denied the severity of bad-loan problem and collaborated to postpone the 
costly resolution of insolvent financial institutions.  There are several reasons for the 
slow response of policy makers. 
 
(i)  A number of large financial institutions were either insolvent or severely 
undercapitalized. 
(ii)  In order to resolve the crisis, public money is necessary.  However, using 
taxpayers' money is not popular. 
(iii)  High officials of the Banking Bureau of the MOF rotate in a few years.  As a 
result, there is a strong incentive for them to postpone the resolution of politically 
difficult problems. 
 
  One important factor in this context was the mismanagement of Jusen crisis.  
Jusen companies are non-bank financial institutions and they were affiliates of groups of 
banks.  Jusen started their business as housing-loan companies but their business was 
limited by two factors.  Japan Housing Loan Corporation, a governmental loan 
company, provided subsidized loan with prime collateral.  Parent banks also started to 
provide housing loans in the late 1970s.    As a result, the Jusen companies are gradually 
marginalized in housing loan market.  In the 1980s, Jusen companies started to shift 
their business to more risky real-estate loans.  Jusen companies often took 
second-rated collateral to make high-risk loans. ￿
 
  After the collapse of the bubble, Jusen companies quickly became insolvent.  
This became obvious for related parties by 1992-93 period but parent banks and MOF 
officials decided to wait for a recovery of real-estate prices.  By 1995, it became a 
serious political problem.  Since Jusen companies financed its real estate loans with 
borrowed money from small agricultural credit unions, the failure of Jusen companies 
would induce failures of a number of such unions.  Since agricultural unions had a 
strong lobby in the Diet, the national congress of Japan, politicians put strong pressures 
on the MOF to resolve Jusen crisis without inducing failures of agricultural credit 
unions.  As a result, Yen 680 billion of public money was used to cover a part of the 
losses of unions without bankruptcy procedures or asking the managers to take 
responsibility.  Seven of the eight Jusen companies were liquidated and most of the 
losses were borne by parent banks.    Against this rather skewed loss-sharing scheme of 
Jusen resolution by the MOF and politicians, public opinion was extremely critical, 
making it politically impossible to discuss further use of public money to resolve 
financial crisis.    As a result, a further postponement of resolution was carried out. 
 
  Market participants were well aware of Japan's problem.  As the asset price 
deflation continues, the funding cost of Japanese banks started to increase relative to 
European and American banks due to the rising credit-risk of Japanese bank.  Even 






2.3. Japanese Financial Crisis since 1997 
In November 1997, the failure of Sanyo Securities, Hokkaido Takushoku Bank 
and Yamaichi Securities sharply increased financial instability.    These events generated 
a severe credit crunch in the Japanese financial market, inducing an extremely serious 
recession.  Then what has caused this enormous problem for Japan?  In my opinion, 
there are two factors behind this financial crisis.   
 
One is the crash of the stock and real estate market bubble in the 1990s.    The 
second is the lost confidence in the accounting and auditing system in Japan.    We note 
that the actual amount of bad loans discovered at failed financial institutions has been 
far larger than the amount published prior to the failure.  The Hokkaido Takushoku ￿￿
Bank was forced into bankruptcy even though it posted profits and paid dividends for 
the year to March 1997.    Financial statements for that year reported Yen 0.3 trillion in 
capital; inspections after the failure found a negative equity of Yen 1.2 trillion as of 
March 31, 1998. This indicates a window-dressing of almost Yen 1.5 trillion.     
 
Likewise, Yamaichi Securities was hiding Yen 260 billion of losses on 
securities investments--worth more than one-half of its equity capital--which neither 
Ministry of Finance inspections nor Bank of Japan examinations were reportedly able to 
uncover.  
 
Depositors and investors of bank debentures issued by long-term credit banks 
imposed some market discipline.  Deposits flew out of banks with low credit ratings 
because depositors feared that they would not be able to withdraw deposit quickly if 
their banks were closed.  LTCB and Nippon Credit Bank faced a rapid early 
redemption of their debentures in 1997 because their debentures were not covered 
deposit insurance system explicitly.  Stock prices of weaker banks fell sharply and 




These financial-institution failures have exacerbated suspicions both at home 
and abroad regarding the financial statements and regulatory supervision of Japanese 
financial institutions.  It was this mistrust of financial statements that widened the 
“Japan premium” charged in overseas markets, blocked the domestic call market (which 
is used for short-term inter-bank loans), and multiplied the number of cash-pressed 
financial institutions turning to the Bank of Japan for loans.  Japanese financial 
markets clearly experienced a kind of credit crunch because of a rash of failures, 
declining asset prices, and growing mistrust of financial statements and regulators.  
This credit crunch in turn cut into corporate investment and hiring, increased 
bankruptcy rates, and reduced consumption and housing investments because workers 
feared for losing their jobs.  That resulted in a further contraction of credit in what 
became a vicious cycle.  In other words, unreliable financial statements had proved a 




The contraction was somewhat abated by the Emergency Economic Package ￿￿
announced by the Liberal Democratic Party and Ministry of Finance at the end of 1997.   
The government prepared Yen 13 trillion for the capital injection to solvent banks and 
Yen 17 trillion for the protection depositors of failed banks.  The Ministry of Finance 
should have used the fund effectively: by forcing banks to write off all the bad loans, the 
financial institutions and the financial oversight by the government could have regained 
the public confidence.  However, most of the money was left unused.  Only Yen 1.8 
trillion of Yen 13 trillion was thinly injected to 21 large banks at the end of March 1998 
without any complete examination or comprehensive cleanup of bank balance sheets.     
 
  The failure of the capital injection became apparent only a few months later.  
In the summer of 1998, the stock price of Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan (LTCB) fell 
sharply when Sumitomo Trust and Banking effectively refused the merger with LTCB.  
LTCB was a big bank with Yen 26.2 trillion of asset at the end of March 1998.  In 
October 1998, just before the LTCB went bankrupt, Financial Revitalization Act and 
Bank Recapitalization Act were enacted in disorderly atmosphere.  This time, the 
government prepared Yen 60 trillion, about 12 percent of GDP: Yen 25 trillion for the 
capital injection into solvent banks under Bank Recapitalization Act, Yen 18 trillion for 
the resolution of failing banks under Financial Revitalization Act such as the capital 
injection into rescue banks, bridge banks, and the disposition of bad loans, and Yen 17 
trillion for the protection of depositors by DIC.
2 
 
  Under Financial Revitalization Act, LTCB and Nippon Credit Bank were 
nationalized in October and December 1998.  Under Bank Recapitalization Act, Yen 
7.5 trillion of capital was injected to 15 major banks at the end of March 1999.    Unlike 
the former attempt, this program was much better designed, succeeding to eliminate 
persistent Japan premium that started in late 1997.  The gradual recovery of the 
Japanese economy and the announcements of big mergers among major banks have also 
contributed to calm the public concern over the financial system. 
 
  Total net cost of these measures will not be known for years to come because 
the government may recover some of these costs by the sales of bad loans and stocks of 
banks.  Gross cost of these operations from 1992 until the summer of 2000 is about 
Yen 27 trillion and can be broken downs as follows:￿

Cost of Capital Injection:          Yen 10 trillion 
2  See Fukao [2000] for the detail of the Bank Recapitalization Act and Financial Revitalization Act. ￿￿
Cost of Grant to Buyer of Failed Institutions  Yen 13 trillion 
Cost of Purchasing Bad Loans      Yen 4 trillion. 
 
 
2.4.  Evolving  Japanese  Deposit Insurance System 
  The Deposit Insurance Law established the DIC in 1971.    The initial role was 
to protect depositors of failed financial institutions up to one million yen per person by 
direct payout of insured deposits.  The limit of coverage was gradually increased to 
Yen 10 million in 1986 and the DIC obtained a new power to assist mergers of failed 
institution and a sound one to protect depositors.  After a few failures of small 
financial institutions in 1994 and 95, the Law was amended in 1996 to allow the DIC to 
fully protect depositors beyond the normal Yen 10 million limit as a temporary 
emergency measure until March 2001.  At the same time, the “general” deposit 
insurance premium was raised from 1.2 BP (basis points) to 4.8 BP, which covers the 
cost of protection up to the Yen 10 million limit.  In addition, “special” deposit 
insurance premium of 3.6 BP was introduced to cover the cost of deposit protection 
beyond the Yen 10 million limit.  At the end of 1997, the DIC obtained the power to 
purchase bad loans from failing financial institutions when they collectively create a 
new bank.
4  The borrowing limit of DIC from the Bank of Japan and private financial 
institutions was also raised from Yen 1 trillion to Yen 10 trillion. 
 
In spite of the full protection of all the deposits beyond the limit of normal 
coverage, public concern over the soundness of financial system became extremely 
intense after the successive failures of Sanyo Securities, Hokkaido Takushoku Bank and 
Yamaichi Securities in late 1997.  Depositors were not sure that the DIC had enough 
money to honor the commitment of the government to protect all the deposits. 
 
  In October 1998, just before the LTCB went bankrupt, Financial Revitalization 
Act and Bank Recapitalization Act were enacted in disorderly atmosphere.  At this 
time, Deposit Insurance Law was also amended.  As a result, a principle of the 
resolution of failed financial institution was established and a new mechanism for 
rehabilitating solvent but under-capitalized ones.  The DIC obtained the following 
temporary roles in this process; to act as an administrator of failing institutions, to 
3 See  Horie  [2001]. 
4  Since this measure is likely to preserve weak financial institutions as a new bank under largely 
unchanged management structure, this method of assistance was abolished in March 1999 after the 
assisted merger of Fukutoku Bank and Naniwa Bank was carried out in October 1998. ￿￿
establish bridge banks to keep failed institutions running, to own stocks of temporarily 
nationalized institutions and choose directors for them, to purchase bad loans from 
financial institutions, and to purchase shares of undercapitalized institutions so as to 
bolster their capital position. 
 
  In May 2000, Deposit Insurance Law was amended so as to prepare the 
permanent resolution scheme for failing banks because Financial Revitalization Act and 
Bank Recapitalization Act expired at the end of March 2001.  In this amendment, 
bridge bank scheme and a procedure of systemic exception from the minimum cost 
principle became a permanent feature of the system.    The termination of full protection 
of deposits was postponed for one year from the end of March 2001.    However, certain 
liquid deposits will be fully protected until the end of March 2003.    Yen 10 trillion was 
added to the Yen 17 trillion fund for the protection of depositors. 
 
 
3.  Excess  Debt  Probability  of  Banks 
  We estimated the excess debt probability of Japanese Banks that have been 
rated by Moody's Investor Service from the stock price data and option pricing theory.  
Specifically, we estimated the probability of insolvency over one-year time horizon.    In 
order to take account of the tendency of forbearance by bank supervisors, we assumed 
that a bank would be allowed to operate until its asset becomes less than 97 percent of 
its liability.    Therefore, bank supervisors would tolerate minor insolvency. 
 
  We will summarize the estimation procedure of excess debt probability 
following Moridaira [1997].  A bank raises its funds by deposit taking and issuing 
shares.  The market value of its asset and debt are V and B (Diagram 1).  We can 
calculate E at time t=0 as a value of a call option with an underlying asset, V, and the 
striking price atBt where  =0.97.    The asset, V, is equal to the net present value of 
its cash inflow.  We assume that the asset, V, follows a log-normal distribution and its 
distribution function, f(V, t), depends on time, t (Diagram 2).  Since the excess debt 
probability at time t=T is equal to the probability of the event, {V<BT}, we have 
following equations to estimate this probability. 
 ￿￿
Excess Debt Probability () ( ) x N    dV   T V, f
T B
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￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿" ￿
￿￿ ￿￿#￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿%￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
 
In this paper, we set one-year time horizon for estimation and T is equal to one.   
The expected return on bank assets is assumed to be equal to risk-free interest rate. 
 
  Since we cannot directly observe the market value of asset, V, and its volatility, 
￿,  we will estimate them from stock prices and disclosure materials of banks.  
Specifically, V is estimated from the market capitalization of banks and the book vale of 
their liabilities at the end of March each year.  The volatility was estimated from the 
daily changes in the market capitalization of banks in the preceding 90 days before the 
end of March.    In order to check the manipulation of stock prices by banks, we looked 
into the turnover and price movements of bank stocks but we could not find any obvious 
abnormal movements except for the case of Nippon Credit Bank in 1998.  The Bank 
supported its stock price by buying its own shares through its subsidiaries. 
 
  The results of our estimation are shown in Chart 7.    We found that the excess 
debt probability in each year is generally higher for banks with relatively low credit 
ratings.  Some banks with low credit ratings have very high bankruptcy probabilities, 
in some cases, approaching unity.  The probabilities went up from March 1997 to 
March 1998 and went down in March 1999.  We have to note that Hokkaido 
Takushoku Bank that had a high excess debt probability in March 1997 actually failed 
in November 1997 and, as a result, the dispersion within Baa3 category declined in 
March 1998.  In March 1999, the excess debt probability generally declined after the 
capital injection to major banks by the government and the nationalization of LTCB and 




  The relationship between the excess debt probability and the credit rating is 
less clear in March 2000 because of the following reasons: 
i)  Some low credit local banks have low estimated excess debt probability 
because they issued large amounts of preferred shares to the government.  Moody's 
apparently regards these preferred shares as unstable capital because banks pledged that 
they would repay government capital as soon as possible. 
ii)  Some weak trust banks have relatively high credit ratings because of their new 
affiliation with major city banks. 
 
  Charts 8 shows the number of banks in each 10 percent range of excess debt 
probability.  In March 1997, some banks already showed very high excess debt 
probability over one-year time horizon.    We can note that some long-term credit banks 
and trust banks showed high probabilities.    One year later, in March 1998, the number 
of banks in high-risk categories increased dramatically, reflecting the much stronger 
concern by market participants after the successive failures of Sanyo Securities, 
Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, and Yamaichi Securities.    The capital injection of Yen 1.8 
trillion yen to major banks in the same month had not reduced the public anxiety over 
the soundness of Japanese banking system.  We can point out the following problems 




i)    Disclosure of bad loans in the banking system was not credible to the public. 
ii)  The amount of capital injection was too small compared with the seriousness of 
the problem. 
iii)  At this time, about 80 percent of injected capital was subordinated debts and 
the market participants regarded them as low quality capital. 
 
  In October 1998, Financial Revitalization Act and Bank Recapitalization Act 
were enacted.  Two major banks were nationalized and Yen 7.5 trillion of capital was 
injected to most of the remaining major banks in March 1999.    Reflecting these strong 
measures by the government, the excess debt probability declined sharply in March 
1999.  We can point out the following aspects of the measures as a relative success of 
this episode: 
 ￿￿
i)  This time, about 80 percent of injected capital is preferred stocks. 
ii)  Two weak banks were nationalized and disappeared from our sample. 
iii)  The supervisory authority set relatively strict conditions for the eligibility of 
capital injection regarding the restructuring efforts and writing-off of bad loans. 
 
However, some trust banks and a long-term credit bank still show relatively 
high excess debt probability.  This is probably because these banks have relatively 
large exposure to real estate and financial sectors that were involved in speculative 
real-estate investment (Table 1).  Table 2 shows the lists of banks with high excess 
debt probability each year and their fate in the following year.  In many cases, banks 
with high excess debt probability announced mergers with other, raised new capital, or 
went bankrupt.   
 
Table 1 and Table 2 
 
4.    Required Capital of Banks to Fully Stabilize Japanese Banking Sector 
  Japanese government carried out re-capitalization of banking sector in March 
1998 and March 1999.  We will investigate whether the injection of public funds was 
enough to fully stabilize Japanese banking sector.    In this analysis, we will estimate the 
required amount of capital injection to “money center banks” so as to reduce the excess 
debt probability of all thee recipient banks to that of Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi which 
has been enjoying the highest credit rating (A1-A2 rating) among major Japanese banks.   
In our estimation, money center banks include city banks, long-term credit banks, trust 
banks (excluding Nippon Trust that became a subsidiary of Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi), 
and Yokohama Bank, which is the largest regional bank.     
 
In this estimation, we made following assumptions: 
 
i)  Capital injection would be carried out as an issuance of preferred stocks to the 
government. 
ii)  New issuance of preferred stocks would not affect the prices of existing 
common stocks. 
iii)  The volatility of bank assets would not change after the re-capitalization by the 
government. 
 
  The estimated required additional capital for March 1998 was Yen 45.1 trillion 
(see Table 3).      It means that it was necessary to increase capital of banks by Yen 45.1 ￿￿
trillion in addition to the actual capital injection of Yen 0.3 trillion in preferred stocks.  
As we have seen in Chart 8, this capital injection was not so effective in reducing the 
excess debt probability and our estimation shows that the required capital injection was 




  The estimated required additional capital for March 1999 was Yen 7.4 trillion 
on top of actual injection of Yen 7.5 trillion.    This additional capital was much smaller 
than one year earlier.  This is partly due to the nationalization of LTCB and Nippon 
Credit Bank.  However these factors explain only one quarter of the decline from Yen 
45.1 trillion to Yen 7.4 trillion.      We think the following factors affected this decline: 
 
i)  During the last three months of fiscal 1998 ending March 1999, the stock price 
volatility of all banks declined by 30-90 percent compared with the volatility one year 
ago.    This reflected the very strong stabilization measure by the government in the fall 
of 1998.  Increased public confidence in the banking sector reduced the estimated 
volatility of bank assets. 
ii)  Banks reduced both assets and liabilities in fiscal 1998.  At the same time, 
market estimate of the net asset of banks increased as a result of policy measures. 
iii)  The excess debt probability of target bank, Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, declined 
from 3.75 percent to 0.87 percent in fiscal 1998. 
 
While the third factor increased the estimated required capital injection, the first and the 
second factors that reduced the required capital dominated the result.  Especially, the 
first factor was most important in reducing the required amount of capital injection. 
 
  Financial market was strongly affected by self-fulfilling prophecies.  When 
market participants started to question the fundamental soundness of the financial 
system, this anxiety itself adversely affected the normal functioning of the market.  
Under certain conditions, this would bring about a financial crisis.    On the other hand, 
when market participants started to regain confidence in the market, the stability of the 
market would be strengthened.  In this respect, the series of stabilization measures 
played an important role in reducing the level of anxiety in the market. 
 
  The estimated required capital increased again to Yen 15.9 trillion for March 
2000 indicating the continued under-capitalization of major Japanese banks.  This ￿￿
increase in the required capital was due to the net result of following reasons: 
 
i)  The volatility of bank stock prices increased for 12 of the 15 banks at the end 
of fiscal 1999.    This reflects the increased risks in the banking sector. 
ii)  The excess debt probability of target bank, the Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi 
declined to 0.78 at the end of fiscal 1999, increasing the required additional capital of 
other banks to reduce their excess debt probability. 
 
  Our estimation of required additional capital for March 2000 indicates that the 
financial fragility of the Japanese economy has not been removed in spite of the strong 
measures taken by the government.  Recent failures of Sogo Department Stores, a 
number of debt forgiveness for construction companies by banks, and the failures of 
three life insurance companies including Chiyoda and Kyoei Life all indicate the 
continued weakness of Japanese financial sector.   
 
5.    Estimation of Risk-Adjusted Deposit Insurance Premium 
  In this section, we estimate the fair risk-adjusted deposit insurance premium 
from the excess debt probability.    Under the existing deposit insurance system and the 
level of market volatility of bank stock prices, the risk-adjusted deposit insurance 
premium is approximately equal to the “general” deposit insurance premium that covers 
the cost of protection up to Yen 10 million limit per person.    Since the current general 
deposit insurance premium is a flat 4.8BP for all banks, we will compare the estimated 
risk adjusted premium with this rate. 
 
  Under the revised Deposit Insurance Law of May 2000, all the deposits of an 
insured bank will be fully protected by the DIC until March 2002.  However, the DIC 
has protected all the liabilities of failed financial institutions in the past.    Therefore, we 
assume that the DIC grants the amount of negative equity to the buyer bank to protect 
all the bank creditors including depositors.    Therefore, the following equation holds: 
 
Grant from the DIC = Max [BT  -   V ,   0 ]                              ( 3 )  
 
The expected value of the grant from the DIC is equal to  the risk-adjusted insurance 
premium under the current system.  Therefore, the fair risk-adjusted deposit insurance 
premium is equal to the price of European type put option on bank asset V with striking 
price BT.  Thus, the fair risk adjusted “total” deposit insurance premium, P, is 
estimated with the following equation: ￿￿
 









Note: See the note of equation 2 for the definitions of variables. 
 
By dividing P with the value of total debt B0, we can estimate the expected rate of 
excess liability at the time of closure.   
 
  The estimated “general” deposit insurance premium is approximately one half 
of the expected rate of excess liability at the time of closure.  Under the Japanese 
deposit insurance system, there is no provision for depositor preference in the resolution 
procedure of bank failures.  As a result, depositors are at par with ordinary unsecured 
creditors under the absolute priority rule of bankruptcy procedure.  Since the shortage 
of asset to repay debt is borne by depositors and ordinary creditors on a pro rata basis, 
the cost of depositor protection by the DIC up to Yen 10 million insurance limit is equal 
to the product of expected rate of excess liability and the amount of insured deposit.  
Deposit insurance premium is levied on all the yen deposit including the part that is 
above Yen 10 million limit.  Since the ratio of insured deposit within all the yen 
deposit is about 50 percent, the fair "general" deposit insurance premium is one half of 
the expected rate of excess liability at the time of closure. 
 
  In the estimation of the expected rate of excess liability, we will use the market 
value of bank assets and its volatility.    In order to estimate these values, we have to set 
the value of forbearance parameter, .  This parameter is the market expectations on 
the behavior of bank supervisors regarding its bank closure policy.  If the bank 
supervisors are expected to close a bank as soon as the liquidation value of bank’s assets 
becomes less than its value of liabilities, this parameter is one.  Usually, bank 
supervisors often do not close banks until the liquidation value of bank’s net asset 
becomes somewhat negative because banks may recover its losses from future profit.  
We estimated this value based on Oda’s method and set  equals 0.97 (see 
Oda[1998]).    It means that the bank supervisors allow banks to operate so long as their 
excess liability is less than 3 percent of their gross asset. 
 
  The estimated expected rate of excess liability is shown in Chart 9.    Generally, 
the expected rate of excess liability of a bank increases as its credit rating falls.  The 
estimated rates of excess liability for March 1998 were much higher than the other three ￿￿
periods.    This was because the sharp fall in stock prices reduced the net asset of banks 
that hold large amount of stocks in their security portfolio.  Moreover, the increased 
volatility of bank stock prices increased the estimated probability of excess liability.  
The estimated expected rate of excess liability of some regional and money center banks 
increased more than ten times over the year earlier.  However, the estimated excess 
rate of liability at March 1999 declined to the pre-crisis period of March 1997.  
Especially, the large banks that received the capital injection from the government in the 
same month experienced a fall of this rate below the March 1997 levels.    On the other 
hand, the chart for March 2000 shows a different picture, two banks with A3 credit 
rating shows high estimated rates.    One of the two banks has low net asset position but 
has a relatively high rating because it has become a subsidiary of a bank with a high 





  The fair “general” deposit insurance premium is equal to about one half of the 
expected rate of excess liability and can be estimated with the following equation: 
 























x N ￿ (4) 
 
where x is defined by equation (2) and  is the ratio of insured deposit within all the 
yen deposit.    In our estimation, we set   =  0.5. 
 
  Table 4 shows the weighted average of fair "general" deposit insurance 
premium for banks classified on their credit rating categories and their business 
categories.  Similar to the estimated excess debt probabilities, long-term credit banks 
and trust banks face higher fair "general" deposit insurance premium than city and 
regional banks.  The premium for city banks fell sharply for the end of March 1999 
when they had just received capital injection from the government.  Moreover, some 
city and regional banks with low credit ratings faced lower fair insurance premium than 
some banks with higher ratings because of the large dose of public capital for fragile 
banks.  Regarding the trust banks in March 1998 and 99, the A3 rating faced a higher 
fair insurance premium than the other trust banks with lower ratings.  This is because 





  We can also observe that the average fair "general" deposit insurance premium 
has been much higher than the actual premium of 0.048 percent.    Even in March 1999 
when we had the lowest estimated fair premium, banks with credit rating of less than 
Baa1 faced significantly higher fair premium than the actual rate. 
 
  Chart 10 then look at the fair "total" deposit insurance premium which is the 
sum of “general” and “special” deposit insurance premium to protect both the insured 
deposits and the other uninsured bank liabilities.    There are a few outliers in this chart.     
Table 5 shows the breakdown of fair “special” deposit insurance premium based on the 
credit rating and business categories and we can find that those outliers are long-term 
credit banks.    The reason of the high fair “special” premium for long-term credit banks 
is that they mainly raise funds with 1-year and 5-year bank debentures that are not 
normally covered by the deposit insurance system.  In order to assess fair amount of 
“special” premium from long-term credit banks for the full protection of their liabilities, 




  The fair “special” deposit insurance premium increased sharply in March 1998 
then declined in March 1999 after the capital injection to major banks.    In this period, 
the average fair “special” premium was 0.084 percent that is still higher than the actual 
rate of 0.036 percent.  However, in March 2000, the fair "special" deposit insurance 
premium increased again to 0.156 percent, indicating a renewed concern over the health 
of Japanese banking sector. 
 
  Total fair deposit insurance premium is shown in Table 6 which is the sum of 
the fair "general" deposit insurance premium in Table 4, and the fair "special" deposit 
insurance premium in Table 5.  Compared with the current flat deposit insurance 
premium of 0.084 percent, estimated fair premium remained high even after the capital 
injection by the government.  The estimated average fair premium rose from 0.260 
percent in March 1997 to the extremely high 2.039 percent in March 1998.  Although 
it fell to 0.136 in March 1999, it rose to 0.249 in March 2000.     
 ￿￿
Table 5 and Table 6 
 
6. Weak Japanese banking system 
 Since the sharp decline of asset prices in 1990, more than a decade has passed.   
The acute financial crisis in 1998 was abated more than three years ago.    However, we 
are still facing an increasing amount of bad loans and very fragile economy. 
 
  We also have to stabilize the weakened life insurance sector, exemplified by the 
recent failures of Chiyoda, Kyoei, and Tokyo Life Insurance.  Life insurance policies 
are an important saving instrument in Japan and this sector controls more than Yen 200 
trillion of asset.  Life insurance companies promised high minimum returns on their 
long-lasting life insurance and annuity policies in the 1980s and early 1990s.  Since 
they did not match the duration of their assets and liabilities, they faced an enormous 
negative yield gap when Japan experienced a very low nominal interest rates in the late 
1990.  However, we do not discuss this problem in detail because it would require a 
book rather than a section of this paper.
5 
 
6.1 Bad loan situations in Japan 
 Table 7 shows the historical data of problem loans of Japanese banks.  Since 
the disclosure of the bad loan situation improved gradually, the data are not consistent 
over the years.   For example, the definition of bad loan outstanding has been widened 
twice and, as a result, the disclosed figures jumped up due to this discontinuity.  Until 
FY 1995, only major banks disclosed loan loss figures.  Japanese banks have lost 66 
trillion yen due to band loans since March 1992 until March 2000.  In spite of this 
enormous loss amounting 13 percent of GDP in 2000, Japanese banks still have more 
than 30 trillion yen of disclosed bad loans or about 6 percent of loan portfolio.  
According to FSA, the total classified loans of banks (not disclosed on a individual 
basis) amount to 63 trillion yen.  The classified loans are more than twice as much as 




  The Chart 11 shows that, while the bad-loan/total loan ratio has stabilized for 
city banks, the ratio of first tier and second tier regional banks has been increasing 
rapidly.  This is partly due to the application of a tougher classification standard by 
5  See Fukao, Mitsuhiro and Japan Center for Economic Research [2000b]. ￿￿




  The Chart 12 compares the bad loan situations in Japan and the United States.  
While US bad-loan/total loan ratio has declined from 3% in 1992 to 1% in 1999, the 
corresponding Japanese ratio has risen from 2% to 6%.  Loan-loss reserve/bad loan 
ratio in the US has been above 160% since 1994, while the similar ratio in Japan has 
been 40-60% range.  We can clearly see that while the US banking sector recovered 
quickly from bad-loan problem in early 1990s, Japanese situation has been deteriorating 




  The cause of this increasing amount of bad loans without loan-loss reserves is 
the low profitability of Japanese banking sector.    Since banks do not earn enough profit 
to write-off all the bad loans, they try to postpone the recognition of losses so as to show 
relatively high capital position.  If they write-off bad loans immediately, most banks 
would not be able to comply with BIS capital requirements and they may even have to 
show negative equity position. 
 
6.2 Bank profitability 
 Table 8 shows the profit structure of Japanese banking sector.  The gross 
lending margin (A), which is the difference between interest and dividend income 
received and the interest paid, has been about Yen 10 trillion in the 90s.    Other revenue 
(B) that includes fees, dealing profit of fixed income securities, and foreign exchange 
operations, was about Yen 3.5 trillion from 1995 until 1998.  However, these figures 
exaggerate the underlying profitability of these activities because bond prices rose 
sharply under falling interest rates.  We think that the underlying profitability of other 




On the other hand, the operating cost has been declining over the past two 
years because of the cost cutting measures by Japanese banks.  Here again, we think 
that it is rather difficult to continue the recent pace of cost cutting.    Certainly, Japanese 
banks may cut salaries and wages further by reducing employees and cutting average ￿￿
compensation.    On the other hand, the computer system of Japanese banks is outdated.   
Banks could not invest in the system adequately because they have been preoccupied 
with bad-loan problem since early 1990s.  In retail banking sector, banks cannot 
compete with national convenience store chains in payment services because banks 
cannot keep up with the sophisticated POS (point of sales) terminals of convenience 
shops.
6  Since banks have to invest heavily in information technology in the future, it 
would be difficult to cut total operating cost further.

 Given these profit and cost figures, the gross profit before taking account of 
loan losses is about Yen 5 trillion.  On the other hand, the loan loss has exceeded the 
gross profit ever since FY 93.    Since FY 94, the loan loss has been 6 to 14 trillion yen.   
Compared with the outstanding loan portfolio of about Yen 500 trillion during this 
period, the loan loss rate has been 1.2 to 2.8 percent.  In other words, the Japanese 
banking sector has not been able to earn enough profit to cover loan losses.    When they 
reported profit at the bottom line, they realized capital gains on their stocks and real 
estates with low book values. 
 
6.3 Weak capital position of Japanese banking sector 
 Corresponding to these flow figures of profits, the capital position of Japanese 
banks has been deteriorating.  Under the Japanese accounting rules on banks and 
lenient application by the regulators, BIS capital ratios have been manipulated in many 
ways.  Banks often used historical cost book keeping of equity portfolio, under 
reserving against bad loans, and subordinated debts from friendly life insurance 
companies so as to raise BIS ratios.  As a result, most failed banks could maintain 
more than 8 percent of BIS capital ratios just before their bankruptcy.  Therefore, we 
tried to estimate simple leverage ratios of major banks and adjusted the simple core 
capital (tier 1 capital) by taking account of unrealized capital gains and losses. 
 
  Table 9 shows the adjusted core capital/total asset ratios for major Japanese 
banks since 1998.   In this estimation, we added unrealized capital gains and loan-loss 
reserves and subtracted the standardized estimated loan losses from disclosed bad-loan 
figures.  This  particular  estimate of capital is used because this variable worked well in 
predicting bank failures over one-year time horizon with a regression model of various 
6  In Zengin electronic fund transfer system, which is the main payment system among customers of 
banks, user cannot send his name and messages in Chinese characters because the system cannot 
handle 2-byte codes.    Because of the outdated Bank payment system, more and more cash 
payments are handle by convenience store chains rather than banks. ￿￿
financial indicators.￿  According to this estimated distribution of core capital/asset 
ratio of banks, the leverage ratio fell to 0.93 percent in March 1998.    According to this 
estimation, as many as eight banks had negative equity position while only two banks 
were  nationalized.  The  capital ratio recovered one year later by Yen 7.5 trillion capital 
injection by the government.  The capital ratio recovered further to 3.48 percent by 
March 2000 as the stock prices recovered.  However, it started to fall as banks 
continued to lose money by bad loans and stock prices started to fall again.    By the end 




  As we can see from Table 9, the capital position of banks is quite sensitive to 
stock prices.  Table 10 shows the capital structure of all the commercial banks.  In 
this table, the core capital based on the traditional historical cost accounting is adjusted 
for unrealized capital gain on stocks, deferred tax asset, and public capital injection but 
not adjusted for under reserving for loan losses.  Although banks show Yen 35.2 
trillion of capital on their balance sheet, this figure is inflated with Yen 8.2 trillion of 
deferred tax asset (present value of future tax shelter) and Yen 7.5 trillion of capital 
injection by the government.  Since banks pledge that they will repay the injected 
capital, the remaining net capital is only Yen 25.6 trillion even if we take account of the 
after-tax unrealized capital gain in their stock portfolio.  This permanent capital is 
small compared with their stock portfolio of Yen 54.5 trillion and Yen 63.4trillion 




Because the market value of stocks held by banks is about two times of their 
net capital account, about a 10 percent fall in stock price index wipes out 20 percent of 
their net capital.  In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the unrealized capital gain (the 
difference between column A and B) was very large and they could withstand the 
fluctuations in stock prices.    However, in the 1990s, banks gradually realized the gains 
so as to show paper profit to cover the huge loan losses.  As a result, the unrealized 
capital gain is depleted when Nikkei index fell below 15000 in late 2000. 

6.4. Causes of unprofitable banking sector 
7  See Fukao, Mitsuhiro and Japan Center for Economic Research [2000a]. ￿￿
 The profit margin of Japanese banks is too small to cover the increased default 
risk after the crush of the bubble.    Many firms have not overcome their debt overhang 
and surviving with the help of their banks.    Banks have not succeeded to increase their 
lending margin under a strong competitive pressure from government-backed financial 
institutions.  Moreover, under the terms and condition of government capital injection 
in March 1999, banks are required to maintain and increase loans to small and medium 
sized firms.    Because of this condition, banks often disregard the internal model-based 
required lending margin to make new loans to small companies.  In the remainder of 
this section, we will look into the effect of financial deregulations and the presence of 
government sponsored financial institutions on the profit margin of private banks. 
 
6.4.1. Effects of deregulations 
 Average lending rate of Japanese banks was 2.1 percent in FY1999. On the 
other hand, the average funding cost was 0.3 percent and the average intermediation 
cost was 1.3 percent.    As a result, the lending spread was only 50 basis points.    Since 
the average credit rating of borrowers from banks is about BB level, the annual loan 
loss rate is well over 1 percent per year.    Although a part of this negative profit margin 
is offset by other revenues such as dealing profit and fees from customers banks are 
making losses from lending business (see Table 8). 
 
  One of the reasons of this low lending spread is the overhang of deposit interest 
rate control until early 1990s.  When the government controlled deposit interest rates, 
banks could easily make money from deposit taking.    On average, banks could get 1.5 
percent point margin between average funding rate and the short-term money market 
rate.    The average lending rate was almost equal to short-term market rates.    This fact 
probably indicates that banks passed a part of regulatory rent of interest-rate control to 
borrowers.    As the deposit-rate control was phased out in the late 1980s and early 1990, 
banks tried to keep profit margin by increasing lending rate relative to short-term 
market rates.  Chart 13 shows that average lending rate rose relative to 3-month CD 




Chart 4 shows the decomposition of lending margin into regulatory rent, which 
is the spread between the short-term market rate and average funding cost, and the true 
profit margin, which is the spread between the average lending rate and the market rate.   
This chart indicates that banks have only replaced the lost regulatory rent with the pure ￿￿
profit margin and have not succeeded to increase their traditional thin margin under a 




 While the banks have not 
raised the profit margin, the borrowers are paying a higher interest rate in relation to the 
money market rate.  Chart 15 shows the past movements of average new lending rate, 
overnight call rate and the GDP deflator inflation rate.  The gap between the interest 
rates and the inflation rate is the real interest rate.    Reflecting loose monetary policy of 
the Bank of Japan, the real interest rate of call rate has fallen since 1991 until 1998.  
On the other hand, the real interest rate of new lending rate has not fallen much because 
of the increasing gap between the new lending rate and the call rate.  While the 
opportunity cost of borrowing for large creditworthy companies is close to the call rate, 
the cost for small and medium sized companies is close to the new lending rate.  
Therefore, smaller companies could enjoy less of the expansionary effect of loose 
monetary policy than larger ones in the 1990s.  This fact may have contributed the 




6.4.2 Presence of government sponsored financial institutions 
 In Japanese financial market, the presence of government-sponsored financial 
institutions (GSFIs) is extremely large.  Table 11 shows the market share of private 
banks and GSFIs at the end of year 2000.  GSFIs have about one quarter of the loan 




In the loan market, GSFIs make very long-term loans at about 2 percent 
interest  rate.  They  are  especially  dominant in housing loan market, holding more than 
half of the outstanding housing loans.  Table 12 shows the central lending rates of 
GSFIs on February 9, 2001.  While their new lending rates are similar to short-term 
loans of private banks, the average term to maturity of GSFIs is much longer.  Since 
government agencies usually accept prepayments of their loans without penalties, their 
loans are more attractive to borrowers.  While the market share of GSFIs in loan 
market is smaller than in other markets, they have 30-40 percent share in rural ￿￿
prefectures.    As a result, banks cannot set significantly higher lending rates over those 
of government agencies.  Since government agencies obtain subsidies of about Yen 1 
trillion per year as direct subsidy and indirect subsidy of zero-cost capital, they can 
cover the losses from credit and other risks in making loans.  Compared with the 
outstanding domestic loans of GSFIs, this subsidy amounts to 0.6 percent point of cost 





 In the deposit market, the Postal Saving System (PSS) is a dominant player.  
The deposit of the System is fully guaranteed by the government.    The deposit interest 
rates are set competitively against those of private deposit taking institutions.    PSS has 
more than 24000 offices and this branch network is by far the largest as a single 
financial institution in Japan.  Even the largest private banking group, Mizuho, has 
about only 600 offices.  Since, PSS does not charge account-maintenance fee on 
customers, it is difficult for private banks to charge such fee without alienating a large 
number of customers.  Under the zero-interest rate policy of the Bank of Japan, banks 
cannot get any profit margin even between zero-interest demand deposit and the market 
rate. 
 
7. Weak governance of banking sector 
  While we have investigated the reason of unprofitable banking sector, still an 
important question remains:  Why banks do not stop unprofitable lending activities?  
In the following, we will introduce a few hypotheses: absence of shareholder control 
and the skewed incentive structure for the bank management due to negative equity 
position. 
 
7.1 Absence of control by bank shareholders 
Although banks issued large amount of preferred shares to the government in 
March 1999, diluting the ownership of existing shareholders, there were no public 
outcry of bank shareholders.  In spite of the near collapse of major banks, all the 
shareholder meetings that approved the issuance of preferred shares to the government 
were generally calm.  No major shareholders objected the deal.  This is because the 
management of major banks are well protected by friendly shareholders such as 
life-insurance companies and industrial companies.    Table 13 shows the list of top five 
8  See Higo [2001] on the role of GSFIs and their institutional details. ￿￿
shareholders of ten major Japanese banks.    Out of 50 listed top shareholders in the list, 




  Since all major life-insurance companies are mutual companies, there is no 
formal cross holding of shares.  However, life-insurance companies often relied on 
banks to cultivate new corporate customers.  Moreover, banks and life insurance 
companies relied on each other to raise broadly defined capital.    As shown in Table 14, 
banks provide subordinated credit and surplus notes to life-insurance companies 
amounting Yen 2.3 trillion at the end of March 2000.    On the other hand, life-insurance 
companies provide Yen 6.7 trillion of subordinated credit to banks and own Yen 7.7 
trillion of bank stocks.  Given this effective double gearing between the two, it is 




As mutual companies, the corporate governance structure of Japanese major 
life-insurance companies is also weak.  In Japanese mutual life companies, 
"representative policyholders meeting" play the role of shareholders meeting in joint 
stock companies.  Each representative policyholder has equal one vote.  They are 
effectively chosen by the management themselves.  Sometimes, they become 
policyholders after being asked to be representative policyholders by the management.  
In other cases, the managers of a company to which the insurance company lend money 
are asked to become representative policyholders. 
 
According to a series of interviews of top managers of major banks and large 
institutional investors by the author conducted in 1997-98, we found the following 
points: 
(1) When banks reported a loss for the first time in decades to the shareholders' meeting 
there were almost no reactions from even large shareholders.     
(2) The bank management generally secures the majority of votes as signed proxy cards 
before shareholder meetings.  In addition, the management makes sure that friendly 
shareholders send representatives to the meeting with more than two third majority 
votes of the meeting. 
(3) A former senior director of a major life-insurance company stated that his company 
had never voted against the management in shareholders meetings.    However, in some ￿￿
rare occasions, his company abstained from voting so as to indicate its dissatisfaction 
with the current management. 
(4) Ministry of Finance regulation and surveillance was strong, so there was little 
incentive for shareholders to monitor bank managements. 
(5) The industrial companies that entered into cross shareholding relationships with 
banks raised their fund primarily through bank borrowings, which made their position 
as shareholders weak. 
 
7.2 Skewed incentive for bank management 
  Another possible reason of lack of profit of Japanese banks is the skewed 
incentive structure for bank managers.  In order to set the incentive structure right for 
corporate management and shareholders, it is necessary to maintain significantly 
positive capital position.    When there is no capital or negative amount of capital, there 
is a skewed incentive for the management to invest in excessively risky projects.    The 
management would also try to conceal negative equity position to keep control of the 
company as long as possible.     
 
  After the successive failure of Japanese financial institutions, very large gaps 
between before-failure and after-failure equity values as we have explained in section 2 
on Hokkaido Takushoku Bank and Yamaichi Securities.  Similarly, LTCB and Nippon 
Credit Bank were found that each of them had negative equity of more than Yen 3 
trillion after their failures.       
 
  I suspect that top managements of most major banks know that their banks are 
either insolvent or very marginally capitalized.  Under such circumstances, the only 
safe exit from their position is to keep their banks running without disclosing the realty; 
i.e. postponing the recognition of bad loans.  They also have to comply with any 
irrational regulations by the FSA including the requirement of making new loans to 
small and medium sized companies with very thin spread. 
 
8.  Remaining  Problems  in  Japanese Financial System 
  In this paper, we showed that the stock market still indicates a strong 
skepticism against the soundness of Japanese banking sector.    Banks are regarded to be 
under-capitalized and the estimated average fair deposit insurance premium is almost 
three times of the current premium.    We believe that this market skepticism reflect the 
number of remaining problems in Japanese financial system 
 ￿￿
  We can learn a number of lessons from the bitter Japanese experience. 
 
(i)  Disclosure and recognition of the depth of the problem is essential.  By 
concealing the true picture, Japan lost a decade of the growth and still struggling to get 
out from the slowly accelerating rate of deflation. 
 
(ii)  Regulators should not allow banks with negative equity to operate under the 
protection by the government.  These zombie banks undercut the lending rate and 
weaken the healthy banks.  Moreover, zombie banks can help firms with negative 
equity.  These bank-supported firms also under price their products and cerate more 
zombie firms. 
 
(iii)  Deflation is very dangerous.  Financial system cannot function well under 
deflation.    Even with zero market interest rate in Japan, the real lending rate is too high 
for small firms to survive under 2 percent deflation.     ￿￿
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Chart 1  Total Market Value of Stocks on the Tokyo Stock Exchange 1st Section
(Percent of nominal GDP)
Notes:  1. Quarterly average of end-of-month.
             2. Data until 79/4Q = 68SNA basis, data from 80/1Q = 93SNA basis
CY            Source: Bank of Japan CD-ROM, 2000.






























Chart 2  Land Price Indexes of Urban Areas
(As a ratio of nominal GDP index; percent; semi-annual)
Notes: 1. Land price indexes of urban areas (six large cities, second half of fiscal 1989 <end Mar. 1990>=100) /
              Nominal GDP index (second half of fiscal 1989=100)
            2. Data until second falf of fiscal 1979 = 68SNA basis
                Data from first half of fiscal 1980 = 93SNA basisSource: Bank of Japan CD-ROM, 2000.































Member banks of the Federation of Bankers Association of Japan
(including Euro-yen impact loans on overseas accounts)
Chart 3 Loans and Discounts Outstanding by Type of Financial Institutions
(Percent of nominal GDP)
Notes:1. Domestically licensed banks: banking accounts of domestically licensed banks + trust accounts of domestically licensed banks
              Prior to 77/1Q, banking accounts of member banks of the Federation of Bankers Association of Japan are banking accounts
              of former member banks of the Federation of Bankers Association of Japan + accounts of sougo banks
              Prior to 93/3Q, banking accounts of member banks of the Federation of Bankers Association of Japan (domestic accounts)
               + trust accounts of member banks of the Federation of Bankers Association of Japan
           2. Prior to 91/4Q, 27 companies basis; from 92/1Q, all insurance companies basis; Source: Total Life Insurance Association of Japan.
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     Source: Bank of Japan CD-ROM, 2000.























































Chart 5   Net Amount of Bonds Issues
(Percent of nominal GDP, 3-qtr MA)
Notes:  1.Data for the Issuance of "Local government bonds," Issuance and Redemption of "Government-guaranteed bonds," and "Yen-denominated foreign bonds"
              are  not seasonally adjusted.
             2. Local govt. bonds, Govt.-guaranteed bonds and Bank debentures : data until 79/4Q = 68SNA basis,  data from 80/1Q = 93SNA basis     Source: Bank of Japan CD-ROM, 2000.












































(Based on the Short-term Economic Survey of All Enterprises in Japan < 'Easy' - 'Tight' >; % points)
CYDiagram 1 Diagram 2
































































































































































































































￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿
￿







































































































































































































































































￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
Trust Accounts
City Regional Regional II Trust LTCBs Major Banks
Manufacturing 14.1 17 11.3 12.5 12.7 8.8
Construction 5.4 8.6 9.8 3.5 3.1 3.3
Public Utilities 0.6 0.7 0.2 1.2 5.3 7.9
Transportation and Telecommunications 3.4 3.2 2.8 4.4 6.5 8.7
Wholesale, Retail and Restaurants 16.1 18.2 16 10.3 8 6.4
Finance and Insurance 9.2 4.8 5.3 20.5 22.6 15.4
Real Estate 13.4 9.5 11.5 18.9 18.9 16.9
Services 14 14.4 15.8 18.2 17.4 9.6
Local Government 0.9 4.3 1.9 0.1 0.4 0.7
Individuals 22.8 19.4 25.3 10.4 5.1 22.4
Outstanding billion yen 218,676 140,073 54,202 30,022 41,147 18,811
Source: Bank of Japan, "Financial and  Economic Statistics Monthly"
Banking Account of All Banks
Table 1    Compositon of Loan Portfolio End of 1998Table 2
           and Events in the Consecutive Year
Banks EDP Event in the Consecutive Year
City 2 97.6% Announced Merger ￿  Bankrupt
Regional 10 85.8% Announced Merger ￿  Merger Withdrawn
Trust 7 67.9% Capital Injection
Trust 4 48.4% Capital Injection
LTCBs 2 38.0% Capital Injection
LTCBs 3 34.7% Capital Injection / Capital Increase
Regional 17 25.8%
Regional 21 24.1%
Regional 13 23.7% Capital Injection
Regional 8 22.5% Capital Injection
Banks EDP Event in the Consecutive Year
Regional 10 83.5%
Trust 4 78.5% Affiliated with City 5
Regional 8 76.9%
City 7 71.5% Capital Injection
Trust 1 70.2% Capital Injection / Announced Merger
Regional 13 69.8%
LTCBs 2 65.7% Failure
Trust 7 65.1% Capital Injection / Announced Merger
Regional 21 64.1%
City 3 47.9% Capital Injection
Banks with High Excess Debt Probability
End of March 1998
End of March 1997Table 2 (continued)
           and Events in the Consecutive Year
Banks EDP Event in the Consecutive Year
Regional 10 99.9% Capital Injection / Capital Increase
Regional 8 67.9% Capital Injection






Trust 4 21.4% Became Subsidiary of City 5
Regional 19 20.2%











Note:  Blank column shows nothing had been observed in .
         EDP: Excess Debt Probability
         Estimated at ￿=0.97
End of March 1999
End of March 2000
Banks with High Excess Debt ProbabilityNumber Required Capital Number Required Capital Number Required Capital
of Banks Trillion Yen of Banks Trillion Yen of Banks Trillion Yen
City Banks 9 26.1 8 3.6 8 9.7
LTCB's 3(1) 5.52.0 1 1.4 1 2.3
Trust Banks 6(5) 13.06.4 5 2.2 5 4.2
Regional Banks 1 0.6 1 0.2 1 0.4
Total 1916 45.135.0 15 7.4 15 15.9
Note: Figures in ( ) are excluding two failed banks and a trust bank which affiliated with a city bank.
        Estimated at =0.97













































































































































































































































￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿Table 4
End of March 1997
Aa2 Aa3 A1 A2 A3 Baa1 Baa2 Baa3
Weighted Average in
Type of Banks
City Banks 0.004% 0.073% 0.067% 0.061% 0.118% 0.055% - 0.600% 0.078%
LTCBs - - - 0.043% - 0.288% - 0.259% 0.161%
Trust Banks - 0.093% - - - 0.128% 0.232% 0.373% 0.178%
Regional Banks - 0.039% 0.013% 0.017% 0.023% 0.036% 0.072% 0.210% 0.055%
Weighted Average in
Credit Rating 0.004% 0.068% 0.060% 0.046% 0.078% 0.100% 0.191% 0.333% 0.090%
End of March 1998
Aa2 Aa3 A1 A2 A3 Baa1 Baa2 Baa3
Weighted Average in
Type of Banks
City Banks - - 0.154% 0.228% 0.358% 0.670% - 4.399% 0.600%
LTCBs ---- 0.314% - - 1.234% 0.758%
Trust Banks - - - 1.225% - 0.399% 2.592% 4.857% 1.693%
Regional Banks - 0.021% 0.039% 0.055% 0.227% 0.088% 0.568% 2.882% 0.499%
Weighted Average in
Credit Rating - 0.021% 0.130% 0.187% 0.308% 0.511% 1.781% 3.610% 0.742%
Fair Risk-adjusted General Deposit Insurance Premium
Weighted Average in Credit Rating and Type of BanksTable 4 (continued)
End of March 1999
Aa2 Aa3 A1 A2 A3 Baa1 Baa2 Baa3
Weighted Average in
Type of Banks
City Banks - - - 0.011% 0.002% 0.031% - 0.000% 0.020%
LTCBs ----- 0.085% - - 0.085%
Trust Banks ---- 0.105% 0.061% 0.111% 0.146% 0.106%
Regional Banks - 0.001% 0.001% 0.040% 0.027% 0.049% 0.063% 0.340% 0.085%
Weighted Average in
Credit Rating - 0.001% 0.001% 0.019% 0.015% 0.038% 0.095% 0.192% 0.053%
End of March 2000
Aa2 Aa3 A1 A2 A3 Baa1 Baa2 Baa3
Weighted Average in
Type of Banks
City Banks - - - 0.005% 0.058% 0.079% - 0.030% 0.053%
LTCBs ---- 0.154% - - - 0.154%
Trust Banks ---- 0.593% 0.224% 0.282% 0.109% 0.220%
Regional Banks - 0.116% 0.133% 0.105% 0.150% 0.093% 0.084% 0.042% 0.103%
Weighted Average in
Credit Rating - 0.116% 0.133% 0.034% 0.081% 0.109% 0.197% 0.062% 0.093%
Note: "-" means no corresponding banks exist.
         Estimated at =0.97
     Averaged with insured deposits.
Fair Risk-adjusted General Deposit Insurance Premium

































































































































































































































































￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿Table 5
End of March 1997
Aa2 Aa3 A1 A2 A3 Baa1 Baa2 Baa3
Weighted Average in
Type of Banks
City Banks 0.008% 0.135% 0.119% 0.104% 0.203% 0.078% - 0.849% 0.130%
LTCBs - - - 0.363% - 2.251% - 3.035% 1.404%
Trust Banks - 0.105% - - - 0.155% 0.286% 0.475% 0.219%
Regional Banks - 0.048% 0.015% 0.020% 0.030% 0.041% 0.080% 0.240% 0.063%
Weighted Average in
Credit Rating 0.008% 0.120% 0.106% 0.109% 0.131% 0.247% 0.233% 0.604% 0.170%
End of March 1998
Aa2 Aa3 A1 A2 A3 Baa1 Baa2 Baa3
Weighted Average in
Type of Banks
City Banks - - 0.329% 0.494% 0.668% 1.181% - 6.923% 1.052%
LTCBs ---- 3.448% - - ####### 7.458%
Trust Banks - - - 1.994% - 0.544% 3.520% 6.407% 2.269%
Regional Banks - 0.025% 0.046% 0.066% 0.296% 0.106% 0.668% 3.377% 0.591%
Weighted Average in
Credit Rating - 0.025% 0.271% 0.368% 0.855% 0.855% 2.377% 6.237% 1.297%
Fair Risk-Adjusted Special Deposit Insurance Premium
Weighted Average in Credit Rating and Type of BanksTable 5 (continued)
End of March 1999
Aa2 Aa3 A1 A2 A3 Baa1 Baa2 Baa3
Weighted Average in
Type of Banks
City Banks - - - 0.022% 0.005% 0.056% - 0.000% 0.037%
LTCBs ----- 1.027% - - 1.027%
Trust Banks ---- 0.223% 0.085% 0.151% 0.190% 0.145%
Regional Banks - 0.001% 0.001% 0.044% 0.029% 0.056% 0.078% 0.386% 0.097%
Weighted Average in
Credit Rating - 0.001% 0.001% 0.028% 0.020% 0.091% 0.127% 0.225% 0.084%
End of March 2000
Aa2 Aa3 A1 A2 A3 Baa1 Baa2 Baa3
Weighted Average in
Type of Banks
City Banks - - - 0.009% 0.116% 0.130% - 0.045% 0.099%
LTCBs ---- 1.975% - - - 1.975%
Trust Banks ---- 1.012% 0.303% 0.420% 0.132% 0.310%
Regional Banks - 0.137% 0.142% 0.111% 0.161% 0.102% 0.102% 0.046% 0.113%
Weighted Average in
Credit Rating - 0.137% 0.142% 0.039% 0.194% 0.155% 0.283% 0.075% 0.156%
Note: "-" means no corresponding banks exist.
         Estimated at =0.97
     Averaged with insured deposits.
Fair Risk-Adjusted Special Deposit Insurance Premium
Weighted Average in Credit Rating and Type of BanksTable 6
End of March 1997
Aa2 Aa3 A1 A2 A3 Baa1 Baa2 Baa3
Weighted Average in
Type of Banks
City Banks 0.012% 0.208% 0.186% 0.165% 0.321% 0.133% - 1.448% 0.208%
LTCBs - - - 0.406% - 2.539% - 3.294% 1.566%
Trust Banks - 0.198% - - - 0.283% 0.518% 0.848% 0.397%
Regional Banks - 0.087% 0.027% 0.037% 0.053% 0.077% 0.152% 0.451% 0.118%
Weighted Average in
Credit Rating 0.012% 0.188% 0.166% 0.154% 0.209% 0.347% 0.424% 0.937% 0.260%
End of March 1998
Aa2 Aa3 A1 A2 A3 Baa1 Baa2 Baa3
Weighted Average in
Type of Banks
City Banks - - 0.483% 0.722% 1.025% 1.851% - 11.322% 1.652%
LTCBs - - - - 3.763% - - 13.005% 8.216%
Trust Banks - - - 3.219% - 0.943% 6.112% 11.264% 3.962%
Regional Banks - 0.046% 0.085% 0.121% 0.523% 0.193% 1.236% 6.259% 1.091%
Weighted Average in
Credit Rating - 0.046% 0.401% 0.555% 1.163% 1.366% 4.158% 9.846% 2.039%
Fair Risk-Adjusted Deposit Insurance Premium
Weighted Average in Credit Rating and Type of BanksTable 6 (continued)
End of March 1999
Aa2 Aa3 A1 A2 A3 Baa1 Baa2 Baa3
Weighted Average in
Type of Banks
City Banks - - - 0.033% 0.008% 0.087% - 0.000% 0.058%
LTCBs - - - - - 1.112% - - 1.112%
Trust Banks - - - - 0.328% 0.145% 0.263% 0.336% 0.251%
Regional Banks - 0.001% 0.002% 0.085% 0.056% 0.105% 0.140% 0.726% 0.182%
Weighted Average in
Credit Rating - 0.001% 0.002% 0.047% 0.035% 0.129% 0.222% 0.417% 0.136%
End of March 2000
Aa2 Aa3 A1 A2 A3 Baa1 Baa2 Baa3
Weighted Average in
Type of Banks
City Banks - - - 0.014% 0.174% 0.209% - 0.075% 0.152%
LTCBs - - - - 2.128% - - - 2.128%
Trust Banks - - - - 1.605% 0.527% 0.702% 0.241% 0.530%
Regional Banks - 0.253% 0.275% 0.216% 0.311% 0.195% 0.186% 0.088% 0.215%
Weighted Average in
Credit Rating - 0.253% 0.275% 0.074% 0.275% 0.264% 0.481% 0.138% 0.249%
Note: "-" means no corresponding banks exist.
         Estimated at =0.97
     Averaged with insured deposits.
Fair Risk-Adjusted Deposit Insurance Premium
Weighted Average in Credit Rating and Type of BanksTable 7
Problem Loan of Japanese Banks (All Commercial Banks)
100 million yen
Financial year  Mar-93 Mar-94 Mar-95 Mar-96 Mar-97 Mar-98 Mar-99 Mar-00
<---Only for major banks----->
Loss from bad loans         (A) 16,398 38,722 52,322 133,692 77,634 132,583 136,309 69,441
  specific reserves 9,449 11,461 14,021 70,873 34,473 84,025 81,181 25,313
  write-off and loan sales losses 4,235 20,900 28,085 59,802 43,158 39,927 47,093 38,646
Cummulative amout of (A) 16,398 55,120 107,442 241,134 318,768 451,351 587,660 657,101
Bad loans outstanding      (B) 127,746 135,759 125,462 285,043 217,890 297,580 296,270 303,660
  Definition of B <-------------------------> <----------------> <-------------------------->
defaulted loans and  defaulted loans, defaulted loans,
loans with arrears loans with arrears loans with arrears
for more than 6 monts for more than 90 days
and loans with  and loans with 
concessional interest concessional terms
rates below ODR. (simillar to SEC rule)
Classified loans 767,000 717,000 642,580 633,860
  Substandard 653,000 655,000 610,240 605,390
  Doubtful 87,000 61,000 31,600 28,350
  Estimated Loss 27,000 1,000 740 120
Total loan loss resreves
    outstanding 36,983 45,468 55,364 132,940 123,340 178,150 147,970 122,300
Total loan outstanding (all domestic banks) 4,827,009 4,823,121 4,779,785 5,066,620 4,961,730


























1) Japan: fiscal year, US: calendar year
2) Figures after FY 1997 do not include data of Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, Tokuyo City Bank,
    Kyoto Kyoei Bank, Naniwa Bank, Fukutoku Bank, and Midori Bank.
3) Japanese bad loan ratio = Risk control loans/total loans
   US bad loan ratio = (loans with arrears for more than 90 days + loans that do not count 
   accrued interest rates as asset + restructured loans)/total loans.

































Financial Year 1989 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99
Lending Margin (A) 7.5 7.1 8.9 9.8 9.2 9.7 10.8 10.7 10.0 9.6 9.7
Other Revenue (B) 2.5 2.6 2.2 2.5 2.8 2.1 3.3 3.7 3.6 3.1 2.5
Operating Costs (C) 6.6 7.1 7.5 7.7 7.7 7.8 7.8 8.0 8.0 7.5 7.3
Salaries and Wages 3.5 3.7 3.9 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.6 3.5
Gross Profit (D)=(A)+(B)-(C) 3.3 2.6 3.5 4.5 4.3 4.0 6.3 6.4 5.6 5.2 4.9
Loan Loss (E) 1.4 0.8 1.0 2.0 4.6 6.2 13.3 7.3 13.5 13.5 6.3
Net Operating Profit (F)=(D)-(E) 1.9 1.8 2.5 2.5 -0.4 -2.2 -7.0 -1.0 -7.9 -8.3 -1.4
Realized Capital Gains (G) 2.8 2.0 0.7 0.0 2.0 3.2 4.4 1.2 3.6 1.4 3.8
Net Profit (F)+(G) 4.7 3.8 3.3 2.5 1.7 1.0 -2.6 0.2 -4.2 -6.9 2.3
Asset 943.6 927.6 914.4 859.5 849.8 845.0 848.2 856.0 848.0 759.7 737.2
Note: Financial Statement of All Commercial Banks.
      Other revenue (B) includes all the other profit such as dealing profits and 
      fees but excludes realized capital gains of stocks and real estates.
      Realized capital gains includes gains of stocks and real estates.Table 9
    Distribution of Adjusted Capital/Asset Ratio of Major Japanese Banks
Number of Banks Weighted Nikkei 225
Total Less than -2% -2% to 0% 0% to 2% 2% to 4% 4% to 6% Average % index
March-98 19 2 6 8 3 0 0.93 16527
March-99 17 0 2 10 5 0 2.07 15837
March-00 17 0 0 4 9 4 3.48 20337
September-00 15 0 0 5 10 0 2.36 15747
February-01 15 0 1 8 6 0 1.86 12883
Note Adjusted Capital = Core Capital + Unrealized Capital Gains and Losses 
        + Loan Loss Reserves - Estimated Loan Losses 
        - Deferred Tax Asset
Estimated Loan Losses = 100% of defaulted loans + 70% of risk loans
  + 20% of doubtful loans + 1% of normal loans
Adjusted Capital/Asset Ratio = Adjusted Capital/Gross Asset
Source: Japan Center for Economic Research, Monetary Policy Under Deflation, March 2001 (in Japanese).Table 10
Stock portfolios and capital in the banking sector 
(trillion yen)
Market value Book value  Capital account Deferred Equity capital held Net capital Account Nikkei225
of shares of shares  (Core capital) tax asset by the government Index
     	

		
Mar-86 46.9 11.9 12.3 0.0 0.0 33.3 15860
Mar-87 63.7 13.4 13.8 0.0 0.0 44.0 21567
Mar-88 77.6 17.6 17.2 0.0 0.0 53.2 26260
Mar-89 97.1 23.2 22.5 0.0 0.0 66.8 32839
Mar-90 88.6 29.7 28.6 0.0 0.0 63.9 29980
Mar-91 77.7 33.1 30.2 0.0 0.0 57.0 26292
Mar-92 56.4 34.5 31.3 0.0 0.0 44.4 19346
Mar-93 56.4 34.5 31.8 0.0 0.0 44.9 18591
Mar-94 61.9 36.5 32.3 0.0 0.0 47.5 19112
Mar-95 52.0 39.8 32.3 0.0 0.0 39.6 15140
Mar-96 64.3 43.0 27.9 0.0 0.0 40.7 21407
Mar-97 54.1 42.9 28.5 0.0 0.0 35.2 18003
Mar-98 50.8 45.7 24.5 0.0 0.0 27.6 16527
Mar-99 47.1 42.7 33.7 8.9 7.5 20.0 15837
Mar-00 54.5 44.4 35.2 8.2 7.5 25.6 20337
Source of data: Federation of Bankers Associations of Japan, "Analysis of Bank 
                        Financial Statements," various issues; securities reports for 
                        individual banks. Note that both market and book values represent 
                        listed shares only. 
Note: Tables represent amounts on the banking accounts of all banks in Japan.
         The market value of stock portfolios was not published prior to March 
         1990, so we have estimated backwards using the Niikkei 225 share price
         index from the end of March 1991. However, the tables
         for 1985-1986 should be discounted, because bank stock portfolios 
         have been gradually increasing, so that values estimated from the end of 
         fiscal 1990 will have an upwards bias the father back one goes.
         Net capital is not adjusted for bad loans.  40% corporate tax rate is assumed.Chart 13 New lending rate and short-term market rate
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Note: GDP deflator inflation rate is adjusted for changes in consumption tax rate in1989 and 1997
Source: Japan Center for Economic Research, Monetary Policy Under Deflation, March 2001 (in Japanese).
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Real Interest RateTable 11
Relative Size of Government Sponsored Financial Institutions (end of 2000)
Asset Share GDP ratio
Loan Trillion yen Percent Percent
Government sponsored agencies 163 26 32
Private banks 464 74 90
Total 627 100 122
Deposit
Postal Saving System 255 34 50
Private banks 486 66 95
Total 741 100 144
Life Insurance (asset)
Postal Life Insurance 119 40 23
Private life insurance companies 180 60 35
Total 299 100 58
Note: Prepared by the author from the data in the Bank of Japan, Financial and
Economic Statistics Monthly, March 2001.Table 12
Government Lending Agencies Basic loan  Average
rate terms
(percent) (years)
Japan Development Bank 2.05 16.7
People's Finance Corporation 2.05 7.3
Japan Finance Corporation for Small Business 2.05 8.9
Japan Finance Corporation for Municipal Enterpri 1.9 N.A.
Housing Loan Corporation 2.7 25.4
Note:  Loan rates are fixed.
Memorandum
Average Loan Rate of All Banks 2.12 Less than 1
Fixed rate housing loan of Fuji Bank 4.65 20
Source: Japan Center for Economic Research, Monetary Policy Under Deflation,
March 2001 (in Japanese).
Lending rates of government sponsored agencies
Interest rates on February 9, 2001Table 13
Top Five Shareholders of Major Japanese Banks
                At the end of September 2000
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
Mizuho Holdings Daiichi Life: 4.1 Nippon Life: 2.7 Sumitomo Trust: 2.1 Yasuda Life: 2.0 Asahi Life: 1.9
Sakura Bank Mitsui Life: 3.6 Taiyo Life: 3.6 Nippon Life: 3.6 State St.: 3.2 Chuo-Mitsui Trust: 3.0
Sumitomo Bank Sumitomo Life: 4.5 Nippon Life: 4.0 Matsushita: 3.3 Sumitomo Trust: 2.4 Sanyo Electric: 2.0
Sumitomo Trust Sumitomo Life: 2.5 State St.: 2.4 Sumitomo Bank: 2.2 Sumitomo Trust: 2.1 Mitsubishi Trust: 1.9
Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi Meiji Life: 5.0 Nippon Life: 3.6 Sumitomo Trust: 2.7 Tokyo Marine: 2.7 Daiichi Life: 2.5
Mitsubishi Trust BOTM: 4.1 Meiji Life: 3.9 Mitsubishi Heavy: 2.7 Sumitomo Trust: 2.4 Asahi Glass: 2.2
Sanwa Bank Toyo Trust: 4.1 Nippon Life: 4.0 SumitomoTrust: 3.3 Daido Life: 3.0 Meiji Life: 2.7
Tokai Bank Toyota: 5.0 Chiyoda Life: 3.7 Nippon Life: 3.0 Toyoshima: 2.4 Daiichi Life: 1.7
Asahi Bank Daiichi Life: 4.1 Chiyoda Life: 3.2 Yasuda Life: 2.8 Asahi Life: 2.1 Sumitomo Trust: 2.0
Daiwa Bank Nomura Sec: 3.2 Tokyo Life: 2.9 Fuji Fire Ins: 2.6 Osaka Gas: 2.5 Nichido Fire Ins: 1.8
Note: Italics are life insurance companies. BOTM; Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi.
Chiyoda Life failed in October 2000 and Tokyo Life failed in March 2001.
Source: Nikkei Kaisha Joho, spring 2001.Table 14 Cross Holding Structure among Life Insurance Companies and Banks 100 Million
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